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R>.ecent U.S. welfare reforms 
culminated in the 1996 welfare reform 
bill. This bill
  changed federal welfare funding 
from a matching grant to states to a 
fixed block grant,
  imposed requirements on states to 
increase employment of welfare 
recipients or reduce welfare rolls,
  gave states greater authority to deny 
or cut off welfare benefits, and
  forbade (with some exceptions) using 
federal dollars to provide welfare to 
an individual for more than five years 
during that individual's lifetime. 
The bill assumes that employment can 
and should replace welfare for most 
welfare recipients. The bill also assumes 
that many welfare recipients can achieve 
employment if welfare agencies just give 
them a "push."
So far, welfare reform has not been the 
disaster that some predicted. As welfare 
rolls have declined, employment rates of 
less-educated single mothers have 
increased (Figure 1). Half of those moved 
off welfare gain income, while the other 
half lose income (Fraker et al. 1997). 
Overall, welfare reform would have to be 
given a grade of "B" or "C."
However, a more appropriate grade for 
welfare reform might be "incomplete."
Over the next 10 years, the "employment 
solution" to welfare faces three 
challenges: 1) employing all welfare 
recipients who are employable; 2) helping 
welfare recipients get and keep good jobs; 
and 3) reconstructing a safety net for 
those who cannot work.
Jobs for All?
Some time in the next 10 years, it is 
likely that the United States will 
experience a recession. In some local 
labor markets, this recession may be 
prolonged. Bad economic times will 
increase welfare applications and make it 
more difficult for welfare recipients to 
find jobs. Furthermore, because current 
federal welfare law provides for only a 
very limited expansion of funding in 
response to a recession, studies suggest 
that at least in some states, a recession 
will lead to pressure to cut welfare 
programs (Levine 1999; Chernick and 
McGuire 1999).
To minimize the damage to the poor 
caused by recessions, policy should 
encourage employment expansion during 
recessions, particularly in local labor 
markets with high unemployment. One 
policy option is a revived New Jobs Tax 
Credit (NJTC). In effect in 1977 and 
1978, the NJTC provided subsidies for
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Figure 1 Welfare Recipients as a Percentage of Population and the Employment-to- 
Population Ratio for Female Heads of Household
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NOTE: Welfare recipients is the number of welfare recipients as a percentage of the total population; data are 
from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The employment-to-population ratio is for female 
heads of household, with other relatives present, ages 16^44, who have less than a college degree; the data 
come from the Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group, and were calculated by the author. Note 
that because the female heads group is 4 percent of the population, and about half of welfare recipients are in 
this group, it is unlikely that all of the female heads who leave welfare actually get a job.
firms that expanded employment above 
some baseline level. Evaluations suggest 
that the NJTC did increase employment 
(Perloff and Wachter 1979; Bishop 1981). 
A revived NJTC might be triggered by 
high unemployment in a local labor 
market; research suggests that 
encouraging employment expansion in 
high-unemployment areas minimizes 
effects on inflation (Bartik 1999). In 
addition, we might consider expanding 
the federal discretionary fund for welfare 
block grants during recessions so that 
states would be encouraged to maintain 
welfare services.
Even when the economy is booming, 
not all welfare recipients who are 
potentially employable will get jobs. The 
best evidence that demand is inadequate 
for the disadvantaged is that programs 
that provide guaranteed jobs for 
disadvantaged persons usually increase 
employment of the target group by 60-70 
percent of the program jobs (Bartik 
1999).
To reach all welfare recipients who are 
potentially employable requires much
more extensive services than the relatively 
cheap placement services emphasized by 
current welfare reforms. Services might 
be needed to enhance labor demand for 
welfare recipients, to provide extra 
support for increased labor supply of 
welfare recipients, and to more 
aggressively link labor demand and 
supply. Among the services that might be 
considered are
  more aggressive placement services 
that would develop job opportunities 
for welfare recipients and screen job 
applicants to ensure they are a good 
match (e.g., the Minneapolis Neigh 
borhood Employment Network; 
Molina 1998);
  last resort, temporary community ser 
vice jobs for welfare recipients in 
nonprofit organizations (e.g., the 
recent experiment "New Hope"; 
Poglinco, Brash, and Granger 1998);
  employment subsidies, distributed in 
a discretionary manner by labor mar 
ket intermediaries, to encourage 
selected small- and medium-sized 
employers to hire screened welfare
recipients (e.g., the Minnesota 
MEED program of the 1980s; Rod 
1988);
  van services, as well as programs to 
provide welfare recipients with inex 
pensive but reliable cars;
  increased funding and better organi 
zation of child care subsidies, partic 
ularly subsidies to provide back-up 
child care services when primary 
arrangements fall through.
Will Jobs Pay Off for Welfare 
Recipients?
Even if we get welfare recipients into 
jobs, we may not reduce poverty, for 
several reasons. First, the lack of job 
retention by many former welfare 
recipients is a major problem. For 
example, one welfare-to-work program in 
Chicago, Project Match, found that 46 
percent of the program's clients lost their 
first job by 3 months, 60 percent by 6 
months, and 73 percent by 12 months 
(Berg, Olson, and Conrad 1991). This job 
loss limits work experience and its 
consequent wage gains. Less-educated^Bk 
and more-educated workers who work ^^ 
full-time and full-year make comparable 
percentage gains in wages (Gladden and 
Taber 2000), but because most former 
welfare recipients do not consistently 
work full-time full-year, real wages for 
former welfare recipients typically go up 
on average by only 1 or 2 percent per year 
(Cancian et al. 1999; Burtless 1995).
So far, policies to increase job 
retention appear to have been ineffective. 
The Postemployment Services 
Demonstration, which tried to increase 
job retention for former welfare recipients 
by providing intensive case management 
services, did not significantly increase 
employment of participants (Rangarajan 
and Novak 1999). Greater job retention 
may require helping employers to 
improve their front-line supervision and 
mentorship of new hires from the welfare 
rolls. Different employers have quite 
different job retention success with 
welfare recipients. For example, job 
retention rates differ greatly with the 
industry of the employer (holding wa£ 
and occupation constant), which may
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fleet different employment practices in
se industries (Bartik 1997).
Another problem for employed ex- 
welfare recipients is that their jobs pay 
low wages, typically around $6-7 per 
hour (Cancian et al. 1999). Increasing the 
minimum wage helps a little, but the 
minimum wage increases needed to help a 
lot would probably be large enough to 
reduce job availability. Increasing the
So far, welfare reform has had it 
easy: pushing the most 
employable welfare recipients 
into a job ... in a booming 
economy.
Earned Income Tax Credit further would 
also help, but increasing the EITC for 
families with children by too much 
beyond its current maximum subsidy of 
40 percent would be difficult, requiring 
either that families remain eligible for the 
TC at higher incomes than at present or
posing a higher implicit tax rates as the 
higher EITC is more quickly phased out.
A more promising way to increase 
wages would be improved training 
programs that would enable ex-welfare 
recipients to be hired in higher-paying 
occupations. A few training programs 
have been able to effectively target 
higher-paying occupations, for example 
the Center for Employment Training 
(Melendez 1996) and Project Quest 
(Lautsch and Osterman 1998). These 
training programs are distinguished by 
their focus on particular industry and 
occupation sectors, their cultivation of 
close ties with employers in designing 
their training, their efforts to ensure that 
program graduates have the skills that 
employers need, and their aggressive 
outreach efforts to develop job 
opportunities for graduates in the targeted 
sectors.
The current "work first" approach to 
welfare reform discourages even six-
training programs. Such training
by some welfare reform 
advocates as inequitable compared with 
what is available to other low-wage
workers. Training programs may be more 
politically viable as part of a workforce 
advancement program available to all 
low-wage workers. All workers might be 
made eligible for larger and more 
generous training/education loans to 
allow them to take night classes or take 
time off for education. Loan terms might 
be more generous for lower-income 
families. Such loans might be repaid as a 
percentage of future income, with loan 
repayments collected by the IRS 
(Bluestone and Harrison 2000).
Can Everyone Work All the Time?
Another issue is how public policy 
should respond to persons who at any 
particular time are unable to find a job. 
First, there are individuals who 
temporarily may be unable to work, either 
due to economic conditions or temporary 
disabilities. Many low-wage individuals 
who lose jobs are ineligible for 
unemployment insurance. Federal and 
state lifetime limits for welfare receipt 
may make hundreds of thousands of 
individuals permanently ineligible for 
welfare benefits (Duncan et al. 1998; 
Moffitt and Pavetti 2000).
We need to recreate some safety net for 
these individuals while continuing to 
encourage work among welfare 
recipients. One policy option is to allow 
individuals to over time recover some 
eligibility for welfare assistance, for 
example allowing one month of 
additional welfare eligibility for every one 
year off welfare.
Second, physical and mental health 
barriers to employment are so extensive 
for some welfare recipients that working 
successfully in an unsubsidized job is 
unlikely. One study found that of welfare 
recipients who had 7 or more barriers to 
employment out of the 14 barriers 
considered (about 3 percent of the welfare 
population), only 6 percent were 
employed at least 20 hours per week 
when contacted 7 to 10 months later 
(Danziger et al. 1999). Many of these 
individuals should probably be made part 
of the disability system.
At the current time, the disability 
system in the United States is under 
debate. There are financial pressures to
reduce the growth of Social Security 
disability and of payments to disabled 
persons under the SSI program. In 
addition, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) has set up a federal policy that 
employers should try to make reasonable 
accommodations to allow persons with 
disabilities to work. However, the welfare 
system has included some individuals 
who really cannot work in regular jobs 
and should be transferred to the disability 
system. Furthermore, some of these 
individuals will not be able to work 
regularly without extensive 
accommodations. If we truly want 
everyone to work, this will require very 
expensive sheltered workshop jobs. In 
some cases, it may be simpler, cheaper, 
and fairer to just provide these ex-welfare 
recipients with disability payments.
Conclusion
So far, welfare reform has had it easy: 
pushing the most employable welfare 
recipients into a job, any job, in a 
booming economy. The harder 
challenges are how to reach the rest of the 
welfare recipients, either with a job or 
with some sort of safety net or disability 
program, and how to get welfare 
recipients to get and keep full-time, full- 
year jobs with adequate pay. Political 
realities suggest that it will be difficult to 
develop policies to do this that are not 
part of broader policies meant to help 
many more persons than just welfare 
recipients. An employment policy for 
welfare recipients must be part of overall 
employment policies that benefit all 
Americans who have irregular jobs or low 
pay.
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Kimmel
Employment-Related 
Child Care Issues
What We Know and What We Do Not
«
1 
i
'hild care policy proposals are 
floated across the national and state policy 
landscape with growing frequency, and 
with good reason. An ever-growing 
percentage of parents are in the 
workforce, with the most recent gains 
attributable in part to the decline during 
the 1990s in welfare receipt for single 
mothers. But even for married mothers 
with young children, labor force 
participation rates are high, although 
many do not work full time or year round. 
Whatever the demographic group, every 
Umily with an employed mother faces a 
myriad of child care choices.
What is the state of knowledge 
concerning employment-related child 
care issues? What will likely be the 
important research and policy issues in 
the near future? To provide a broad 
overview in response to these questions, 
the relevant child care issues can be 
grouped into four broad areas: 1) factors 
affecting child care costs and the choice 
regarding type and place of child care 
provider; 2) quality; 3) the direct 
relationship between child care prices and 
employment behavior; and 4) federal and 
state child care spending.
Several factors are important to 
parents' choices concerning the child care 
provider, where modes of nonparental 
care include relative care, family day care 
(care in unrelated individuals' homes), or 
center-based care. Parents respond to 
some unknown subset of quality factors, 
including child:adult ratios, caregiver
* 
lining and turnover, consistency of 
orals between parents and caregivers, 
reliability and convenience of care, and 
price. However, the existing literature
does not explain sufficiently just how 
parents are weighing these different 
quality factors. There is some evidence 
that parents respond to prices when 
making modal choices, and an increased 
probability of using center-based care is 
seen with full-time employment 
(Connelly and Kimmel 2000).
Factors affecting child care prices also 
have a direct effect on child care quality, 
implying that issues 1 and 2 are linked. 
The most significant factor in child care 
cost is the wages of child care workers, 
which by almost any reasonable standard 
are notoriously low. As a result, there is 
frequent turnover of child care workers, 
which negatively affects quality and also 
raises costs. And, although many states 
impose minimum training and education 
requirements of its child care workers in 
center-based care, most child care 
workers are still untrained in child 
development and first aid.
Child care quality concerns include the 
measurement of quality, observable 
linkages between quality and child 
outcomes, and the relationships between 
quality, mode, and government 
regulation. Regarding the availability and 
importance of child care quality, evidence 
suggests that in the United States, much 
of available child care is of insufficient 
quality; see, for example, the report titled 
Cost, Quality and Child Outcomes in 
Child Care Centers (Helburn et al. 1995). 
However, the evidence linking child care 
quality and child outcomes is less clear. 
Blau (1999) finds little association 
between child care quality and child 
development on average, and finds 
inconsistent effects when focusing on
lower-income children. But recent 
findings from the Carolina Abecedarian 
Project show long-term positive 
development effects, persisting to the age 
of 21, of providing particularly high- 
quality child care beginning in infancy to 
at-risk children.
The link between state regulations and 
child care quality is complex. While 
stricter regulations do seem to increase 
the quality of care provided by licensed 
providers, this increased quality comes 
with a higher price tag, resulting in a 
decline in the demand for such licensed 
care (Hofferth and Chaplin 1998).
The empirical evidence of the 
importance of child care costs in the 
employment decisions of both married 
and single mothers is growing. The bulk 
of this evidence suggests differences 
across marital status in the responsiveness 
of employment to child care prices. Low- 
income white single mothers, who devote 
up to 30 percent of their incomes to child 
care, exhibit relatively greater
The effectiveness of means-tested 
child care subsidies could be 
improved—and in fact assessed 
more concretely—if policy goals 
were clarified.
employment responsiveness to child care 
prices (Kimmel 1995). Although there is 
disagreement in the child care literature 
about the magnitude of this employment 
response, the evidence is clear that 
providing subsidies has a meaningful 
impact on work behavior (see, for 
example, Kimmel 1998). Child care 
prices have differential impacts for full- 
time versus part-time workers as well, 
with Connelly and Kimmel (2000) finding 
that both married and single mothers are 
less responsive to child care prices in their 
part-time employment choices than in 
their full-time employment choices. 
Finally, the evidence concerning the 
relationship between child care prices and
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the choice of actual hours worked is 
weak.
What about federal and state spending 
on child care? The availability of child 
care subsidies, provided via the income 
tax system or more directly to providers 
or consumers, can alter the relative supply 
and demand for different modes of care 
and, as a result, can affect child outcomes 
as well as employment of parents. In fact, 
tension often arises between the goals 
concerning child development and 
employment (Blau, forthcoming). Child 
care subsidies are also politically 
palatable work-tied transfers, raising the 
overall standard living of the recipient 
families. The effectiveness of means- 
tested child care subsidies could be 
improved and in fact assessed more 
concretely if policy goals were clarified 
or if key response parameters were 
known, including the responses to 
subsidies in parents' modal choices and 
the responses by suppliers to the 
availability of subsidies. Other policy 
issues include the appropriate regulation 
of providers, the modes of care that 
should be subsidized, and the availability 
of subsidies to encourage providers to 
locate in underserved areas.
Across these four broad areas, other 
gaps exist in our current state of 
knowledge. A significant portion of the 
gap in the child care literature reflects 
insufficient knowledge of choices and 
behavioral responses for specific 
subgroups, particularly the welfare-to- 
work population (Council of Economic 
Advisors 1997). We do not know how 
this subgroup will care for their children 
when faced with inconsistent work 
schedules, shift work, and frequent job 
changes. We also know very little about 
the issues and concerns related to care for 
school-aged children, the parental 
motivation underlying observed child care 
quality choices, and details concerning 
differences in child care preferences 
across ethnic groups. Also, there is 
insufficient research documenting 
presumed shortages in specific types of 
care (such as infant care and off-hours 
care), although some surveys do 
document an overall excess demand for 
nonparental care of specific types.
We also have insufficient information 
regarding quality in the various modes of 
care, regardless of how one measures 
quality, and the evidence of long-term 
effects of poor quality care for the average 
child is scant, as is evidence of the link 
between child care cost and availability 
and school completion (for the latter, see 
Kaukmann et al. 2000). Finally, what is 
the appropriate expenditure on child care 
subsidies? A recent study of welfare 
leavers reports that few are receiving 
subsidies (Center for Law and Social 
Policy 1999), and only 1.24 million of the 
approximately 10 million children 
eligible for federally funded support 
received assistance in 1997 (U.S. Dept. of 
Health and Human Services 1999).
Because of the importance of child 
care costs in the low-income working 
family's budget and the importance of 
child care in welfare reform, policy could 
be better informed by data gathered in a 
purely experimental context. That 
implies some sort of random assignment 
experiment in which individuals 
(probably recent welfare leavers) are 
offered different versions of child care 
subsidies, without variation in a broad 
package of other benefits, to observe 
individuals' willingness to utilize 
different versions of subsidies and the 
impact of the subsidies on employment 
outcomes (Blau, forthcoming). 
Unfortunately, one result of welfare 
reform is that states are no longer required 
to conduct such expensive experiments.
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This study is important, says 
Madden, because "Knowledge of the 
circumstances surrounding changes in 
metropolitan income inequality is 
essential to our understanding of how 
the larger economy affects income 
distributions. We cannot respond with 
economic or social policies (or even 
decide not to respond) to changes in 
income inequality or other 
metropolitan economic issues without 
such knowledge." 
186 pp. $34 cloth ISBN 0-88099-204-2 
$15 paper ISBN 0-88099-203-4 / 2000
Full text of the first chapters of 
these books is available at http:// 
www.upjohninst.org.
Bidding for 
Business
The Efficacy of Local 
Economic Development
Incentives in a 
Metropolitan Area
John E. Anderson, University of Nebraska
Robert W. Wassmer 
California State University-Sacramento
Anderson and 
Wassmer examine 
the use and 
effectiveness of 
local economic 
development 
incentives within 
a specific region, 
the Detroit 
metropolitan area. 
The Detroit area serves as a good 
example, they say, because of the 
area's 20-plus year track record of its 
communities offering the gamut of 
economic incentives aimed at 
redirecting economic activity and jobs. 
The evidence they uncover reveals 
factors that drive cities not just in this 
southeast Michigan area, but 
nationwide to offer particular types 
of incentives that are more or less 
generous than those offered by their 
neighbors.
"Since we know that the fiscal 
blight experienced in core cities 
relative to periphery cities got no better 
over this period (a case could be made 
for it getting worse)," say Anderson 
and Wassmer, "bidding for business 
was the likely reason that periphery 
cities used a greater number of 
incentives over time."
The authors use this finding and the 
results of their simulations to assess 
the three policy choices for the future 
of local incentive activity in a region: 
free choice, elimination, and 
regulation.
220 pp. $35 cloth ISBN 0-88099-202-6 / $17 
paper ISBN 0-88099-201-8 / 2000
Economic 
Conditions and 
Welfare Reform
Sheldon H. Danziger, Editor 
University of Michigan
Welfare reform is widely touted as 
the reason welfare caseloads have 
declined rapidly over the last few 
years. Apparently, say a group of 
researchers, reforms have contributed 
to this decline, but so has the booming 
economy. If this is true, what will 
happen to 
caseloads should 
the economy enter 
a recession, and 
what will states do 
to confront rising 
welfare costs?
The
relationship 
between welfare 
caseloads and the economy is one of 
the key issues addressed in this 
important new book. Using the most 
current data available, a group of the 
nation's leading researchers examines 
the effects of welfare reform prior to 
and after enactment of the 1996 
Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA). What they find is a mixed 
picture.
Says Danziger, "Taken together, the 
chapters in this volume suggest that, in 
its first few years, the 1996 welfare 
reform has been more successful in 
some dimensions (notably, reducing 
caseloads) than in others (raising 
disposable income). Much of the 
success to date is due to a booming 
economy and to a fiscal environment in 
which states have more funds to spend 
per recipient than they had in the past. 
Nonetheless, even under these optimal 
economic and fiscal conditions, some 
recipients have already 'slipped 
through the cracks.'" 
321 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-200-X / $22 
paper ISBN 0-88099-199-2 / 1999.
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